People From The U.S. And China Think About Their Personal And Collective Future Diferently Part 3

Counterbalancing analyses

In Experiment 2, participants were randomly assigned to complete either the past or future prompts first. Did the order in which participants completed the task influence their performance on the task? Would the main analyses described above hold when we include counterbalancing order in the analyses? Given the different valence patterns for the two countries, we analyzed the effects of counterbalancing order separately.

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For the U.S., we conducted a 2 (domain: personal vs. collective) × 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (temporal period: past vs. future) × 2 (counterbalanced order: pastors vs. future-first) mixed-model ANOVA with a Holm correction. We first examined the significant effects related to counterbalancing. There was a signifcant counterbalancing-by-temporal period interaction, F(1, 79) = 15.53, p = .002, ηG 2 = .016. 

Simple effects tests revealed that U.S. participants who completed the future prompts first generated more future items than past items (Mdif = 4.89, 95% CI [1.98, 7.80]), whereas participants in the U.S. who listed past items first generated more past items than future items (Mdif = 3.27, 95% CI [0.29, 6.27]). Thus, U.S. participants showed a fatigue effect. No other effects involving counterbalancing order or temporal period were significant (all Fs < 4.74). Second, even when including counterbalancing in the model there was still a Valence × Domain interaction, F(1, 79) = 110.35, p < .001, ηG 2 = .054, suggesting that the key results from Experiment 2 are consistent even when accounting for counterbalancing order.

For China, we also conducted a 2 (domain: personal vs. collective) × 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (temporal period: past vs. future) × 2 (counterbalanced order: past-first or future-first) mixed-model ANOVA with a Holm correction. Critically, there were no main effects or interactions involving counterbalancing order (all Fs < 3.88), suggesting that responses were similar regardless of which order participants completed the tasks. 

Additionally, there was a main effect of the domain, suggesting that Chinese participants listed more personal items (M = 28.39, 95% CI [26.76, 30.02]) than collective items (M = 19.65, 95% CI [18.31, 21.00]), F(1, 87) = 151.24, p < .001. ηG 2 = .174, and a marginal main effect of the temporal period, suggesting that Chinese participants listed more future items (M = 25.29, 95% CI [23.73, 26.86]) than past items (M = 22.75, 95% CI [21.36, 24.14]), F(1, 87) = 8.36, p = .068, ηG 2 = .010. No other main effects or interactions were significant (all Fs < 4.27). The lack of other effects is consistent with the main analyses that failed to show a domain-by-valence interaction for the past or the future and failed to show any interactions involving the temporal period. Thus, the main conclusions of our central analyses are supported even when counterbalancing order is accounted for.

Does time frame predict optimism toward the future?

We ran a 2 (time frame: 1 week vs. 5–10 years) × 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (domain: personal vs. collective) repeated-measure ANOVA, with a Holm correction, for just the U.S. responses to the future prompts. Replicating the main analyses, we found a main effect of the domain, F(1, 80) = 66.58, p < .001, ηG 2 = .097, and a valence-by-domain interaction, F(1, 80) = 57.07, p < .001, ηG 2 = .038. More important for the current analyses, as shown in Table 1 there was a main effect of time frame, F(1, 80) = 26.18, p < .001, ηG 2 = .016, indicating that participants listed fewer items for the future week (M = 16.23, 95% CI [14.69, 17.78]) than for the future 5–10 years (M = 18.60, 95% CI [17.05, 20.16]), and a time frame × Valence interaction, F(1, 80) = 10.34, p < .008, ηG 2 = .006. Across both the personal and collective domains, U.S. participants listed more negative than positive items for the next week (Mdif = −1.35, 95% CI [−2.20, −0.50]) but an equal number of positive and negative items for the next 5–10 years (Mdif = 0.11, 95% CI [−0.65, 0.87]). 

This suggests that U.S. participants had a negative bias about the near future but no bias toward the far future, which supports our initial prediction that U.S. participants would be more optimistic about the remote future compared with the near future. This outcome is different from Experiment 1, where the time frame did not influence responses. One potential explanation is that Experiment 2 was conducted during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, whereas Experiment 1 was conducted before the pandemic. Living during the height of a pandemic may have influenced the responses such that participants might expect significant improvement as the pandemic dies down further into the future. We return to this idea in the general discussion.

We also ran a 2 (time frame) × 2 (valence) × 2 (domain) repeated-measure ANOVA, with Holm correction, for just the Chinese responses to the future prompts. Replicating the main analyses, there was a main effect of the domain, F(1, 94) = 87.20, p < .001, ηG 2 = .123. Additionally, as shown in Table 1, there was a main effect of time frame, F(1, 94) = 76.72, p < .001, ηG 2 = .057, indicating that participants listed fewer items for the future week (M = 11.23, 95% CI [10.43, 12.04]) than for the future 5–10 years (M = 14.06, 95% CI [13.18, 14.94]). Finally, there was a Time Frame × Domain interaction, F(1, 94) = 6.72, p = .011, ηG 2 = .005. Chinese participants listed more personal items at 5–10 years than one week (Mdif = 1.02, 95% CI [.052, 1.52]), and more collective items at 5–10 years than one week, (Mdif = 1.81, 95% CI [1.43, 2.19]). The lack of interaction between time frame and valence supports our initial prediction that valence would remain relatively stable into the remote future for Chinese participants.

In sum, the increased optimism toward the remote future compared with the near future was shown only in the U.S. (negative toward the recent future and neutral toward the remote future) but not in China (no Valence × Time Frame interaction).

General Discussion

The current studies make three contributions. First, we replicated past work demonstrating a personal/collective valence dissociation in future thoughts for Western samples (Shrikanth et al., 2018). Second, we showed that this personal/ collective dissociation was not universal across cultures, a possibility acknowledged by Shrikanth and colleagues. Participants in China displayed no valence bias for either their personal or collective future. Finally, Experiment 2 demonstrated that people’s valence patterns for the past mirrored their valence patterns for the future. This was true in both the U.S. and Chinese samples.

U.S. participants replicated past research showing a dissociation between personal and collective future thought

To our knowledge, no researchers have successfully replicated the specific pattern of valence dissociation between personal and collective future thoughts seen in prior work using the future fluency task (Shrikanth et al., 2018; but see Yamashiro & Roediger, 2019, for a partial replication). By successfully replicating the pattern, this study contributes to the generalizability of this dissociation in the U.S. given recent calls for direct replications in psychology (Chambers, 2017). The results suggest that the way people in the U.S. think about the future of their personal lives is different from the way they think about the future of their country.

Chinese participants think about the future differently than U.S. participants

The major finding of our study is that participants in China thought about the future differently than participants in the U.S. in two ways: (1) Chinese participants’ valence for their future did not differ from the valence for their collective future, and (2) people in China were neutral toward both their personal and collective futures. Why might these patterns occur?

One factor may be the differences across cultures in how people remember the past. Because people draw on their memories to imagine the future, and because studies have found that people from China often express a more positive view of history than people from other countries (Choi et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2009), it makes sense that people from China were less negative toward the collective future than Americans. This was our main hypothesis for the study.

Additionally, we were surprised to find that Chinese participants did not show a positivity bias in the personal domain. However, this outcome is consistent with two previous studies. One study on autobiographical memory found that European Americans evaluated their recent personal past more positively than people in East Asia (Oishi, 2002). Another study found that Americans may be driven to evaluate themselves in more positive terms overall (Heine, 2005). Thus, differences in future thinking in both the personal and collective domains may be the result of the types of memories people have of the past.

A second explanatory factor may be cultural differences in self-construal. Past studies have suggested that people in collectivistic countries consider themselves more interdependent with their society and environment compared with people in individualistic countries (S. X. Chen et al., 2018; Sims et al., 2015). In other words, participants in China may not have differentiated their personal and collective future to the same extent as did U.S. participants (for a related idea, see Y. Zhu et al., 2007). Future studies can try to pull apart this explanation by putting people into a holistic or analytic thinking style (Talhelm et al., 2015) or priming individualism and collectivism (Oyserman & Lee, 2008).

Additionally, a third factor, dialectical thinking, may explain the lack of valence bias in both domains (Fang & Faure, 2011; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Dialectical thinking is characterized by three fundamental beliefs: that the world is constantly changing, that two contradictory ideas can both be true at the same time, and that it is difficult to understand a specific event without examining its place in a larger context. For example, one study found that people from China were more likely than people from the U.S. to expect change in the future and to expect the direction of change to shift over time—a positive event may eventually become negative and vice versa (Ji et al., 2001). If people in China tend to think dialectically (as has been demonstrated in cross-cultural research; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Schimmack et al., 2002), this could explain the more balanced view of the personal and collective future displayed by people from China.

Of course, the above factors are all psychological variables, yet economic and sociological variables could provide alternative explanations. For example, China’s tremendous economic growth over the past decades could be causing people in China to have a more positive view of both history and the future (Zhu, 2012). State-run media in China is another potential cause since state-run media often focuses on positive events. Indeed, many Chinese participants listed phrases from Chinese Communist propaganda such as “the Belt and Road” and “build a community with a shared future for mankind” (D. Chen, 2019). Alternatively, restrictions on free speech might have caused participants to withhold negative future thoughts or list positive future thoughts to be consistent with the official narrative of the Chinese government (Huang & Cruz, 2021; Wang & Mark, 2015; Yang & Vicari, 2021).

Taken together, there are several potential frames for understanding cultural differences in collective future thinking. Our goal in the current paper was to examine whether cultural differences in collective thinking exist. A promising direction for future research is to begin testing some of these specific frameworks and to begin connecting cultural forces to psychological processes.

Memory may be related to future thinking within both the personal and collective domains

Experiment 2 showed that memories and future thinking had a similar valence pattern (for both the personal and collective). This outcome fits with research that proposes that people draw on memories to imagine the future (Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016; Topcu & Hirst, 2020). It is important to note that this study is the first to use the fluency task for both the personal and collective past and future in a single experiment. Past studies have either examined memories and future thoughts for personal and collective domains in separate experiments (Shrikanth & Szpunar, 2021; Shrikanth et al., 2018) or used different tasks to examine memories and future thoughts (Öner & Gülogöz, 2020; Yamashiro & Roediger, 2019). Using the same task to examine the past and the future in the same study provides stronger evidence that people use similar processes in memory and prospection.

Of course, the relationship between memory and future thinking is complex. For example, Yamashiro and Roediger (2019) demonstrated that people may show implicit trajectories of decline, where nations are moving away from a golden era, and Topcu and Hirst (2020) showed a slight positive trajectory between the past and future for collective events. Both trajectories imply a shift in emotional valence between the past and future. Likewise, scholars have argued that envisioning future scenarios may shape how people remember the collective past, perhaps by activating certain schemas or narrative templates (Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016). Further research can begin to unravel precise relationships between the past and the future.

Effects of COVID‑19

It is important to note that Experiment 1 was conducted in 2019 and Experiment 2 was conducted in late 2020, during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Did the pandemic affect future thinking? In the supplemental materials, we report an analysis comparing Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 that revealed two main results. First, participants in Experiment 1 generated more items than participants in Experiment 2. Second, there was an Experiment × Valence × Time Frame three-way interaction. Unpacking this interaction suggested that in Experiment 1 participants did not show a Valence × Time Frame interaction. In contrast, in Experiment 2 participants had a negativity bias when considering the next week, but a neutral (or very slightly positive) perspective when considering the next five to ten years. This outcome suggests that for participants who completed our study during the pandemic, the far future was rosier than the immediate future, likely because they were envisioning a post-pandemic future. Notably, this pattern occurred when collapsing across the country.

Limitations

There are two key limitations in our studies. The first is that samples used in this study limit the conclusions we can draw concerning larger cultural differences. Our samples came from single universities (one in South Carolina, USA, and one in Hubei, China), so various factors, such as the specific geographical region or the types of students at each institution may not be representative of the rest of each country. Given the similarity of our American results to other results with Western samples we feel confident about the replicability of that result. However, future research may wish to explore collecting data from other institutions or regions within China. Exploring collective future thinking in other cultures aside from China may also be a powerful way to determine the key factors that influence collective future thinking. Finally, because the future fluency task used in our study only accounts for the number of items generated (a relatively coarse index), it is inadequate at addressing qualitative characteristics. Future studies could address qualitative components of future thinking.

Conclusion

In sum, this study found that people think about the future of their own lives and the future of their country differently. At the same time, this dissociation appeared in the U.S. but not in China. This highlights the importance of accounting for culture when studying cognitive processes.

Acknowledgments

We thank Olivia Tracy, Sam Gary, Nicole Greenfeld, and Liuqing Wei for their assistance with this project. W. Deng is now at the University of Illinois and A. Rosenblatt is now at George Washington University.

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